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Abstract
This Article attempts to contribute to the study of international class arbitrations by providing
a clear framework for discussion, an explanation of the current status, and a description of the chal-
lenges facing the development of class actions in the field of international commercial arbitration.
As international arbitration is a system praised for offering a predictable and efficient mechanism
to resolve transnational business disputes, it is submitted that the international commercial arbitra-
tion community should promptly implement a specific regulatory framework for class arbitrations
that avoids uncertainties and addresses its special features.
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class arbitrations by providing a clear framework for discussion, 
an explanation of the current status, and a description of the 
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arbitration is a system praised for offering a predictable and 
efficient mechanism to resolve transnational business disputes, it 
is submitted that the international commercial arbitration 
community should promptly implement a specific regulatory 
framework for class arbitrations that avoids uncertainties and 
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INTRODUCTION 
Determining whether class actions should be admissible in the 
context of international commercial arbitration is a highly contentious 
issue, both in theory and practice. As a dispute resolution mechanism 
created by the parties’ consent and characterized by their direct 
involvement in appointing the arbitrators and defining the procedure, 
it is not clear how these essential features shall interplay in the 
context of class arbitrations where the members of the class are bound 
by the award regardless of their participation in the course of the 
proceedings.1 The academic community has been unable to provide a 
uniform understanding about the convenience of permitting class 
arbitrations, and most international regulations are silent in regards to 
its applicability. Accordingly, this Article attempts to contribute to the 
study of international class arbitrations by providing a clear 
framework for discussion, a description of the current status, and an 
analysis of the specific challenges facing the development of class 
actions in the field of international commercial arbitration. 
I. DEFINITION OF CLASS ACTION AND CLASS ARBITRATION 
Class actions have been described as a procedural device 
allowing plaintiffs to file a claim not only for themselves, but also on 
behalf of other persons with the same interests.2 Although only the 
representative is involved in the proceeding, the class members are 
equally bound by the outcome.3 
Class arbitration may be defined as a form of arbitration that 
enables one or a number of parties to bring a claim before an arbitral 
tribunal on behalf of others in a similar position. As it has generally 
followed an analogous model to class action litigation, the party 
                                                                                                                                  
1. JEFF WAINCYMER, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
581 (2012). 
2 . BERNARD HANOTIAU, COMPLEX ARBITRATIONS: MULTIPARTY, MULTICONTRACT, 
MULTI-ISSUE AND CLASS ACTIONS 260 (2006). 
3. NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
154 (5th ed. 2009). Gary Born explains the concept of class actions in the United States in the 
following terms: “Under the U.S. litigation system, a class action is a civil suit, often a mass 
torts or consumer litigation, in which one or more named plaintiffs represent a large, 
sometimes indeterminate, number of similarly-situated individuals in pursuing related claims 
against one or more defendants.” Gary Born, The U.S. Supreme Court and Class Arbitration: 
A Tragedy of Errors, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (July 1, 2011), http://kluwer
arbitrationblog.com/2011/07/01/the-u-s-supreme-court-and-class-arbitration-a-tragedy-of-
errors/. 
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initiating the proceeding asserts to represent a group of claimants.4 
Class arbitration, while being a relatively recent phenomenon, is most 
commonly viewed as a procedural mechanism mixing arbitration with 
the class action procedures applicable under US litigation law. 5 
Although it can be described as a hybrid between judicial class 
actions and traditional arbitration, international class arbitration 
presents some differences with both of them. It is different from 
litigation because class arbitration applies the typical hallmarks of 
arbitration, and in addition the class members are limited only to 
those governed by similar arbitration agreements. 6  In turn, class 
arbitration differs from traditional arbitration mainly because the class 
representative seeks relief on behalf of other class members, and 
therefore “issues that generally do not arise in arbitration, such as 
certification of a class, issues of notice, [or] opting in/opting out” 
actually do manifest themselves in class arbitration. 7 Since 
international class arbitration could be administered by an arbitral 
                                                                                                                                  
4. WAINCYMER, supra note 1, at 581. 
5. Gary Born & Claudio Salas, The United States Supreme Court and Class Arbitration: 
A Tragedy of Errors, 2012 J. OF DISP. RESOL. 1, 21 (2012), http://scholarship.law.missouri.
edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1122&context=jdr. 
6. Michael Schafler & Amer Pasalic, Is Canada Ready for Class Arbitration?, ADRIC, 
2, 3 (2013), http://www.dentons.com/en/~/media/B2160274017E49CCBE32401178504FB9.as
hx. As stated by another author: “Arbitration is a matter of contract between the parties in that 
one cannot be required to submit to arbitration unless he has agreed to do so.” Martin 
Saunders, Class Arbitrations – Who Decides?, THE NAT’L L. REV. (Sept. 2, 2014), http://
www.natlawreview.com/article/class-arbitration-who-decides. 
7. Schafler & Pasalic, supra note 6, at 2, 3. The authors explain the aforementioned with 
these words:  
It is different from a class action because it involves a type of representative 
proceeding injected into the arbitral realm, and many of the classic hallmarks of 
arbitration, including choice of decision-maker, customized procedures, and 
confidentiality, would characterize class arbitration as well. Further, the arbitral 
class in a class arbitration is restricted to parties governed by similar arbitration 
agreements as the class arbitration representative. In other words, the claims 
advanced in a class arbitration are limited by the nature of the contract in which the 
arbitration agreement is found. On the other hand, class arbitration is different from 
traditional arbitration because it can involve up to hundreds of thousands of parties 
in a single proceeding, while most arbitrations are either bilateral in nature, or 
involve relatively few parties at most. Whereas a traditional arbitration involves 
claims advanced on behalf of a single party, a class arbitration involves a party 
seeking relief on a representative basis. As a result, issues that generally do not arise 
in arbitration, such as certification of a class, issues of notice, opting in/opting out, 
etc. do manifest themselves in class arbitration. 
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institution or proceed on an ad hoc basis,8 it is uniquely placed to 
efficiently provide a large number of individuals with the opportunity 
to resolve their claims at a single time and in a neutral venue, before 
an arbitral tribunal rather than domestic courts.9 
II. CLASS ARBITRATION AS A FORM OF COLLECTIVE 
REDRESS 
The concept of collective redress encompasses “any mechanism 
that may accomplish the cessation or prevention of unlawful business 
practices which affect a multitude of claimants or the compensation 
for the harm caused by such practices.”10 It may pursue an injunctive 
or compensatory purpose and can take a variety of forms.11A highly 
popular form of collective redress is US-style class actions, and the 
most well-known example in the field of alternative dispute resolution 
is US domestic class arbitration. 12  As the international legal 
community has shown an increasing interest in procedures that allow 
resolving collective disputes, international commercial class 
arbitration is a promising but yet-to-be-developed form of collective 
redress.13  
It is important to note that international class arbitration should 
be distinguished from other types of multiparty proceedings, which in 
general terms may be described as any dispute involving more than 
two parties in the same arbitration. 14  As a matter of fact, class 
                                                                                                                                  
8 . S.I. Strong, Does Class Arbitration “Change the Nature” of Arbitration? Stolt-
Nielsen, AT&T, and a Return to First Principles, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 201, 207 (2012) 
[hereinafter Does Class Arbitration “Change the Nature” of Arbitration?]. 
9. S.I. Strong, Resolving Mass Legal Disputes Through Class Arbitration: The United 
States and Canada Compared, 37 INT’L L. & COMM. REG. 921, 942 (2012) [hereinafter 
Resolving Mass Legal Disputes Through Class Arbitration]. 
10 . What is Collective Redress, BRITISH INST. OF INT’L & COMP. L., http://www.
collectiveredress.org/collective-redress/what-is-collective-redress (last visited Apr. 6, 2016). 
11. Id. 
12. S.I. Strong, Collective Arbitration Under the DIS Supplementary Rules for Corporate 
Law Disputes: A European Form of Class Arbitration?, 29 ASA BULLETIN 145, 145 (2011) 
[hereinafter A European Form of Class Arbitration?]. 
13. S.I. Strong, Class Arbitration Outside the United-States: Reading the Tea Leaves, in 
7 MULTIPARTY ARBITRATION, DOSSIERS OF THE ICC INST. OF WORLD BUS. L. 189 (Eric A. 
Schwartz & Bernard Hanotiau eds., 2010) [hereinafter Class Arbitration Outside the United-
States: Reading the Tea Leaves]. 
14 . Ferdinando Emanuele & Milo Molfa, Multiparty Arbitrations: The Italian 
Perspective, CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN & HAMILTON LLP: THE EUR. AND MIDDLE EASTERN 
ARB. REV. 64 (2012), http://www.cgsh.com/files/Publication/3ffa7c24-e013-440a-9c9a-
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arbitration usually determines the rights of a large numbers of parties 
in a single process, the amounts at stake are very high, and the nature 
of the claims involve parties who seek relief on a representative 
basis. 15 Class arbitration differs from consolidated arbitrations 16 
because the first is “contemplated when stakes in any individual case 
remain small enough to make [individual] arbitration impractical from 
a cost standpoint,”17 while consolidation involves different cases that 
would proceed by themselves, but present “related parties as well as 
common issues of law and fact, making it more economical for the 
claims to be heard together by a single tribunal.”18 Additionally, in 
class arbitrations the claimant asserts to represent other stakeholders 
entitled to a similar recovery under analogous arbitration agreements, 
while consolidations involve independent but related claims where no 
individual is acting on behalf of the others. 19 Similarly, class 
arbitrations need to be distinguished from the joinder of parties, 
which implies the addition of a third party to the arbitration based on 
a reference to the applicable rules or principles, such as implied 
agency, piercing the corporate veil or the alter ego doctrine.20 Either 
by adding a claimant or a respondent, the joinder does not change the 
fact that traditional arbitration is unable to deal with cases of great 
magnitude where the members of the class are so numerous that the 
joinder of all of them is deemed impracticable.21 
III. IS CLASS ARBITRATION DESIRABLE? 
Class arbitration has been praised for increasing the efficiency 
and reducing the costs of having to arbitrate numerous single claims. 
                                                                                                                                  
2d8a32706de3/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/2e7939f0-865f-44b6-beac-30724bd41a41/
Multiparty%20Arbitrations_The%20Italian%20Perspective_2012.pdf. 
15.  Does Class Arbitration “Change the Nature” of Arbitration?, supra note 8, at 212-
13. 
16 . Consolidation of arbitrations has been defined in the following terms: 
“[c]onsolidation is a procedural mechanism allowing for two or more claims to be united into 
one single procedure concerning all related parties and disputes.” Lara Pair, Efficiency at All 
Cost – Arbitration and Consolidation?, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Mar. 14, 2014), http://kluwerarb
itrationblog.com/2014/03/14/efficiency-at-all-cost-arbitration-and-consolidation/. 




20. Id. at 104. 
21 . Gabrielle Nater-Bass, Class Action Arbitration: A New Challenge?, 27 ASA 
BULLETIN 671, 671 (2009). 
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Ultimately, it guarantees that all claimants are treated equally and 
avoids the danger of conflicting decisions when different tribunals are 
confronted with the same set of facts. Moreover, class arbitration 
secures access to justice, as it provides claimants with the opportunity 
to bring a claim when the individual amounts do not justify initiating 
a proceeding.22 Finally, it also enables claimants to command more 
resources by combining their cases, giving them “greater leverage by 
compounding the defendant’s risk of loss.”23 
Opponents of international class arbitrations have explained that 
such procedures cannot maintain the informality, cost-efficiency, 
speed, confidentiality and business-oriented methodology of 
traditional arbitration, 24  and that they would require excessive 
interference from domestic courts. In other words, that class 
arbitrations would change the nature of arbitration.25 Additionally, it 
has been argued that class arbitration is bad for business,26  faces 
enforcement uncertainties, and is unlikely to guarantee the validity of 
the class members’ consent.27 Finally, some authors have mentioned 
that class arbitration might not be admissible in civil law jurisdictions 
where the idea of developing collective forms of actions is generally 
rejected.28 
The criticism towards international class arbitration is not 
entirely accurate or admissible. Although class arbitration certainly 
presents unique features, such circumstances do not change its arbitral 
nature or the fact that international class arbitration is just another 
type of arbitration proceeding within the arbitral realm.29 Indeed, the 
areas “in which class arbitration differs most significantly from other 
forms of multiparty arbitration—the provision of representative relief 
and the underlying policy rationales—meet the standards” to be truly 
considered as arbitration.30 
                                                                                                                                  
22. Id. at 672. 
23. HANOTIAU, supra note 2, at 260. 
24.  Class Arbitration Outside the United-States: Reading the Tea Leaves, supra note 13, 
at 188. 
25.  Does Class Arbitration “Change the Nature” of Arbitration?, supra note 8, at 202 
(referencing Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775 (2010)). 
26. Class Arbitration Outside the United-States: Reading the Tea Leaves, supra note 13, 
at 186. 
27. WAINCYMER, supra note 1, at 583. 
28. Class Arbitration Outside the United-States: Reading the Tea Leaves, supra note 13, 
at 187. 
29.  Does Class Arbitration “Change the Nature” of Arbitration?, supra note 8, at 268. 
30. Id. at 269. 
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Furthermore, arguments in the sense that international class 
arbitration includes excessive formalities and judicial involvement are 
also unpersuasive as a means of supporting the argument that class 
arbitration changes the fundamental nature of arbitration.31 It has been 
explained that “arbitration is, and has long been, a highly diverse 
form of dispute resolution, routinely including very formal, very large 
and very complicated multi-party proceedings.”32 Additionally, it is 
not certain that class arbitration would be bad for business, as 
empirical studies have shown that corporations’ biggest criticism to 
the procedure–that claimants file frivolous claims to force high 
settlements–is demonstrably incorrect and based more on perception 
than reality.33 Ultimately, the benefits that class arbitration can offer 
to the development of international arbitration seem to outweigh any 
potential risks, thus being desirable if applied under a proper 
procedure. In any case, the study of international class arbitration is 
extremely important because a growing number of commentators and 
practitioners believe that it will spread beyond US borders without 
necessarily adopting the same procedures as those used in US-style 
class arbitrations.34 
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF CLASS ARBITRATIONS 
A. United States 
Class arbitrations have been broadly considered by the legal 
community as a procedure distinctly used in the United States. Their 
courts were pioneers in developing a regulatory framework applicable 
to domestic class arbitrations. Arbitral institutions contributed to 
further develop the applicable rules as well.35 
                                                                                                                                  
31. Id. 
32. Born & Salas, supra note 5, at 22. 
33. Class Arbitration Outside the United-States: Reading the Tea Leaves, supra note 13, 
at 186. 
34. S.I. Strong, From Class to Collective: The De-Americanization of Class Actions, 26 
ARB. INT’L 493, 494 (2010) [hereinafter From Class to Collective: The De-Americanization of 
Class Actions]. 
35 . Schafler & Pasalic, supra note 6, at 2 (citing Resolving Mass Legal Disputes 
Through Class Arbitration, supra note 9, at 936). 
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1. US Supreme Court and Class Arbitration 
The development of class arbitrations in the United States can be 
traced to the 1980s, when corporations started including arbitration 
agreements in their standard forms of contracts, as a mechanism to 
avoid class actions in the judicial context and force potential class 
plaintiffs to individually resolve their disputes. This was a clear 
attempt to limit the number of claims as well as the financial exposure 
of the companies.36 As this situation was certainly abusive, US courts 
began to compel arbitrations on a class basis, allowing a party to 
bring a claim on behalf of a number of claimants (usually consumers) 
similarly situated, against the same defendant and based on identical 
arbitration agreements. 37  Domestic courts and arbitrators “began 
ordering parties into class arbitration, with procedures reflecting the 
individual preferences and concerns of different arbitral tribunals and 
state courts.”38 
However, class arbitration only became popular in 2003 after the 
US Supreme Court decision in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. 
Bazzle.39 The Court explained that it was for the arbitrator to decide 
whether class arbitration was allowed or not,40 that is to say “whether 
an arbitration agreement permitted class arbitration was an issue that 
arbitrators, not courts, were to decide.”41 Additionally, Bazzle ruled 
that class arbitration could be available even if the arbitration 
agreement was silent about when class arbitration was implicitly 
contemplated by the parties.42 The commented decision lead to the 
creation of special class arbitration rules by two well-known arbitral 
institutions: (i) the Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations of the 
American Arbitration Association (“AAA”); and (ii) the Judicial 
Arbitration and Mediation Services (“JAMS”) 43  Class Actions 
                                                                                                                                  
36. From Class to Collective: The De-Americanization of Class Actions, supra note 34, 
at 497. 
37. Born & Salas, supra note 5, at 21-22. 
38. From Class to Collective: The De-Americanization of Class Actions, supra note 34, 
at 498. 
39.  539 U.S. 444 (2003). 
40. Neal Troum, The Problem with Class Arbitration, 38 VT. L. REV. 419, 430-31 
(2013). 
41. Born & Salas, supra note 5, at 22. 
42. Born, supra note 3. 
43. JAMS Inc. (formerly known as Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Service Inc.). 
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Procedures. 44  The importance of the Green Tree decision for the 
development of class arbitration has been illustrated as follows: 
While there is evidence to suggest that class arbitration has been 
in existence in the U.S. since at least the early 1980s, the device 
gained significant traction across the United States only in 2003, 
when the United States Supreme Court implicitly approved the 
procedure in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle. 45 
In 2010, the US Supreme Court took a different approach to 
class arbitration in Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds International 
Corp.46 The context of this case was that the arbitrators had concluded 
that class arbitration was permissible even though the parties had 
agreed that the arbitration agreement was silent as to the availability 
of such a procedure. After granting certiorari, the US Supreme Court 
analyzed whether imposing class arbitration was consistent with the 
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 47  deciding that the arbitrators 
exceeded their authority by allowing class arbitration because “the 
arbitrators could not have interpreted the parties’ contract to allow 
class arbitration” when they had accepted that the arbitration clause 
was silent in this regard. 48  In other words, where an arbitration 
agreement is undoubtedly silent about class arbitration, that procedure 
shall not be permissible because there are no contractual grounds for 
concluding that the parties agreed to arbitrate on a class-wide basis.49 
Finally, while some commentators consider that the US Supreme 
Court reversed the Bazzle ruling that the arbitrators should determine 
whether the parties had consented to class arbitration,50 others have 
argued that the decision only narrowed the possibility to conclude that 
the parties contemplated class arbitration, but that such determination 
“remains one for the arbitral tribunal to make in the first 
                                                                                                                                  
44. Rachael Kent & Marik String, Availability of Class Arbitration Under US Law, in 18 
ICCA CONGRESS SERIES, 853, 856 (2015). 
45. Schafler & Pasalic, supra note 6, at 2. Or as stated by another author: “Through a 
quick analysis of the USA’s experience, it is possible to see that in the wake of Bazzle v. Green 
Tree, in 2003, hundreds of class arbitrations were administrated before the main Arbitration 
Centres, such as AAA and JAMS.” Romulo Greff Mariani, Class Arbitrations in Brazil?. 
KLUWER ARB. BLOG (May 14, 2014), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2014/05/14/class-
arbitrations-in-brazil/. 
46. 559 U.S. 662 (2010).  
47. Kent & String, supra note 44, at 859. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Born, supra note 3. 
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instance.” 51 Subsequently in 2011, in AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepción, the US Supreme Court addressed the validity of class 
arbitration waivers.52 The case involved an arbitration arising from a 
federal court action brought by consumers against the manufacturer of 
mobile phones, where the standard form contract provided for 
arbitration but prohibited class proceedings.53 The US Supreme Court 
ruled that the FAA preempts state laws invalidating class arbitration 
waivers54 freely agreed by the parties.55 
The impact of the US Supreme Court decisions in Stolt-Nielsen 
SA v. AnimalFeeds International Corp and in AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepción for the development of class arbitrations has been 
explained as follows: 
A decade later [after the decision in Green Tree Financial Corp. 
v. Bazzle], however, the Supreme Court issued two decisions that 
performed a fairly complete about-face, effectively overruling its 
earlier holding in Bazzle and largely closing the door on class 
arbitration under the FAA. In StoltNielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds 
Int’l Corp., the Court held that class arbitration was only 
permissible in contracts that affirmatively provided for this 
procedure. That holding substantially undercut both the Court’s 
earlier decision in Bazzle and the burgeoning growth of class 
arbitrations. More recently, in AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepción, the Court upheld class waiver provisions in 
arbitration agreements against unconscionability challenges.56 
In 2013, the US Supreme Court decided the Oxford Health Plans 
LLC v. Sutter case, where it upheld the decision of an arbitrator 
stating that class arbitration was permitted by the parties’ arbitration 
clause, even though the arbitration agreement did not expressly allow 
class arbitration. 57  The Court differentiated this case from Stolt-
Nielsen, explaining that on that occasion, the parties accepted that 
they never reached an agreement on class arbitration, making it 
impossible for the panel to allow class arbitration based on the 
                                                                                                                                  
51 . George A. Bermann, The “Gateway” Problem in International Commercial 
Arbitration, 37 YALE J. OF INT’L L. 1, 45 (2012). 
52. 563 U.S. 333 (2011); see Kent & String, supra note 44, at 860. 
53. PARK, supra note 17, at 98. 
54. Abigail Rubenstein, Arbitration Contracts Can Ban Class Actions: High Court, LAW 
360 (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.law360.com/articles/241700/arbitration-contracts-can-ban-
class-actions-high-court. 
55. Mariani, supra note 45. 
56. Born & Salas, supra note 5, at 22. 
57. 133 S.Ct. 2064 (2013); Kent & String, supra note 44. 
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parties’ intent. On the contrary, in Oxford Health that issue was in 
dispute and the parties assigned the arbitrator the task of interpreting 
the arbitration agreement.58 Accordingly, the US Supreme Court was 
deferential to the arbitrator’s decision that the agreement permitted 
class arbitration.59 That decision “preserves the role of arbitrators in 
determining whether the parties have agreed to class arbitration, and 
ensures that such decisions survive the limited judicial review” 
allowed by the FAA.60 Only ten days after Oxford Health, in the 
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant case, the US 
Supreme Court issued another decision revisiting the validity of 
waiving the possibility of class arbitration proceedings, rejecting the 
challenge against a class arbitration waiver.61 
Finally, regarding the judicial history of class arbitration in the 
United States, it is worth noticing that a number of procedures with 
international scope already exist in that country, 62  namely, the 
Harvard College v. Surgutneftegaz case involving a defendant based 
in Russia, the CBR Enterprises LLC v. Blimpie International Inc. case 
concerning several US defendants with international holdings that 
might be subject to enforcement orders, and the Bagpeddler.com v. 
US Bancorp case also involving non-US claimants as part of a class 
of more than 400,000 Internet vendors. 63 
Ultimately, what the future of class arbitration will be in the 
United States is not clear among the legal community. The US 
Supreme Court decisions have somehow limited the applicability of 
                                                                                                                                  
58. Id. 
59. Ted Howes & Hannah Banks, A Tale of Two Arbitration Clauses: The Lessons of 
Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter for the Future of Class-Action Arbitration in the United 
States, 30 J. OF INT’L ARB. 727, 732 (2013). 
60. Matthew A. Lee & Lucas Bento, Class Arbitration In The United States Survives 
Another Battle, But Will It Survive The War?, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (June 21, 2013), http://
kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2013/06/21/class-arbitration-in-the-united-states-survives-another-
battle-but-will-it-survive-the-war/. 
61. Kent & String, supra note 44. 
62. Lea Haber Kuck & Gregory A. Litt, International Class Arbitration, in WORLD 
CLASS ACTIONS: A GUIDE TO GROUP AND REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS AROUND THE GLOBE 
711 (Paul G. Karlsgodt ed., 2012), https://www.skadden.com/sites/default/files/publications/
Chapter%2030%20%20International%20Class%20Arbitration.pdf. 
63. S.I. Strong, Enforcing Class Arbitration in the International Sphere: Due Process 
and Public Policy Concerns, 30 U. PA. J. OF INT’L L. 4, 5 (2008) [hereinafter Enforcing Class 
Arbitration in the International Sphere: Due Process and Public Policy Concerns]; 
Surgutneftegaz v. President and Fellows of Harv. Coll., No. 04 Civ. 6069, 2007 WL 3019234 
(S.D.N.Y 2007); CBR Enter., LLC v. Blimpie Int’l, Inc. (Am. Arbitration Ass’n, Apr. 19, 
2006); Bagpeddler.com v. U.S. Bancorp, Case No. 11 181 0032204 (Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 
May 4, 2007).  
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class arbitration. Some have even argued that the FAA should be 
construed as not allowing class arbitration at all.64 
2. Institutional Procedures on Class Arbitrations: The AAA and 
JAMS 
As stated before, the US Supreme Court ruling in Green Tree 
Financial Corp. v. Bazzle lead institutions such as AAA and JAMS to 
create special class arbitration rules.65 In 2004, the AAA issued a plan 
explaining that it would administer class arbitrations according to 
Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitration if the arbitration 
agreement is silent with respect to class claims but specifies that 
disputes arising out of the parties’ agreement shall be resolved by 
arbitration in accordance with the AAA Rules.66 The AAA procedure 
adapts the requirements of class actions to the nature of traditional 
arbitration, including special decisions regarding the applicability of 
class arbitrations under the arbitration clause, the suitability for the 
arbitration to proceed as class arbitration and the practice of notices to 
the potential members of the class, among several other issues. Rule 3 
of the Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations establishes that 
“[u]pon appointment, the arbitrator shall determine as a threshold 
matter, in a reasoned, partial final award on the construction of the 
arbitration clause, whether the applicable arbitration clause permits 
the arbitration to proceed on behalf of or against a class.”67  The 
decision is known as the Clause Construction Award.68 Following the 
Clause Construction Award, the arbitrator shall stay all proceedings 
“for a period of at least thirty days to permit any party to move a court 
of competent jurisdiction to confirm or to vacate” the decision.69 Once 
all parties inform in writing that they are not seeking judicial review 
of such award or the time period expires, “the arbitrator may proceed 
with the arbitration on the basis stated in the Clause Construction 
Award.”70 
                                                                                                                                  
 
65.	Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003). 
66. HANOTIAU, supra note 2, at 277. 
67. Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations, AM. ARB. ASS’N, INC. (2011), https://
www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?url=/cs/groups/commercial/documents/document/dgdf/mda0/
~edisp/adrstg_004129.pdf[hereinafter Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations of the AAA]. 
68. HANOTIAU, supra note 2, at 277. 
69. Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations of the AAA, supra note 67. 
70. HANOTIAU, supra note 2, at 277. 
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In accordance with Rule 4 of the said norms, if the arbitrator 
considers that  
the arbitration clause permits the arbitration to proceed as a class 
arbitration . . . or where a court has ordered that an arbitrator 
determine whether a class arbitration may be maintained, the 
arbitrator shall determine whether the arbitration should proceed 
as a class arbitration. . . . In doing so, the arbitrator shall 
determine whether one or more members of a class may act in the 
arbitration as representative parties on behalf of all members of 
the class described.71  
According to Rule 5, that determination has to “be set forth in a 
reasoned, partial final award,” known as the “Class Determination 
Award.” The same rule establishes that the arbitrator “shall stay all 
proceedings following the issuance of the Class Determination Award 
for a period of at least 30 days to permit any party to move a court of 
competent jurisdiction to confirm or to vacate the Class 
Determination Award.”72 If all parties inform the arbitrator in writing 
that they do not intend to seek judicial review of the Class 
Determination Award, or once the requisite time period expires 
without any party having informed the arbitrator that it has done so, 
the arbitrator may proceed with the arbitration on the basis stated in 
the Class Determination Award. 
According to Rule 6 of the commented norms, “the arbitrator 
shall, after expiration of the stay following the Class Determination 
Award, direct that class members be provided the best notice 
practicable under the circumstances.” That decision is called “Notice 
of Class Determination,” and “shall be given to all members who can 
be identified through reasonable effort.” 73  Rule 8 regulates issues 
related to settlements, voluntary dismissals and compromise. 
Regarding confidentiality, Rule 10 establishes that the “presumption 
of privacy and confidentiality in arbitration proceedings shall not 
apply in class arbitrations,” making public all class arbitration 
hearings and filings. Moreover, the AAA maintains on its web site a 
“Class Arbitration Docket of arbitrations filed as class arbitrations,” 
providing some information related to the proceeding.74 
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The JAMS Class Actions Procedures is similar to the AAA 
Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations and provides a further 
attempt to adapt the practice of judicial class actions to the special 
features of arbitration.75 Similar to the AAA procedure, under the 
JAMS rules, the arbitrator has to determine whether the arbitration is 
allowed to proceed as a class action.76 As stated, the arbitrator “shall 
determine as a threshold matter whether the arbitration can proceed 
on behalf of or against a class” and “shall set forth his or her 
determination with respect to the matter of clause construction in a 
partial final award subject to immediate court review.”77 
The main difference between the JAMS and the AAA rules is 
that the AAA rules “mandat[e] that an arbitrator write separate awards 
embodying the arbitrator’s decisions on clause construction and class 
certification and then wait after each award for a period of at least 
thirty days to permit any party to apply to a court to confirm or to 
vacate the award,” while the JAMS procedure leaves the arbitrator “to 
decide whether to embody his or her decisions on clause construction 
and class certification in partial final awards subject to immediate 
judicial review.” 78  Another relevant difference is that the rules 
adopted by JAMS do not contain an explicit provision regarding the 
confidentiality of the class arbitration proceeding. The applicability of 
these domestic proceedings is limited. As a matter of fact, it has been 
noted that the AAA and the JAMS class arbitration rules are only 
applicable to domestic class arbitrations. These rules are not available 
for international class arbitration proceedings.79 
B. Situation in Countries Other than the United States 
Numerous civil and common law jurisdictions in Europe and 
America have adopted or are considering adopting mechanisms of 
collective redress for group injuries under their domestic 
regulations. 80  In recent years various European countries have 
established specific regulations in their legal systems to “allow a 
                                                                                                                                  
75. Nater-Bass, supra note 21. 
76. Id. 
77. JAMS Class Actions, JAMS, 2 (May 1, 2009), http://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/
Documents/JAMS-Rules/JAMS_Class_Action_Procedures-2009.pdf. 
78. HANOTIAU, supra note 2, at 279. 
79. Nater-Bass, supra note 21. 
80. From Class to Collective: The De-Americanization of Class Actions, supra note 34, 
at 500. 
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group of plaintiffs to litigate similar claims in one action.”81  For 
instance, in Sweden the so-called group actions are admissible since 
2003 under the Group Proceedings Act. This norm considers an opt-in 
mechanism, as “group actions may be asserted by any class member 
or specially appointed organization where the action is based on 
circumstances that are common or similar to the claims of the 
members of the group and where the applicant is in a financial 
position to pursue the claims.”82 In an empirical research conducted in 
2008, a professor concluded that although it was too soon to 
adequately analyze the impacts of the commented law, no information 
showed that the fears of business were justified.83 
Another example is the United Kingdom, where group litigations 
regarding claims giving rise to common issues of fact or law have 
been allowed since 2000. Courts in the UK may issue a group 
litigation order “establishing a register on which the relevant claims 
will be entered and specifying which court will manage the claims.”84 
Subsequently, additional claimants may opt-in by filing an individual 
claim and existing parties are entitled to opt-out, as the final decision 
is binding only regarding those registered.85 Other countries that have 
adopted rules allowing groups of plaintiffs to litigate similar claims in 
the same proceeding are Denmark, Norway, Finland, Germany, 
Spain, and Italy.86 
In addition to the United States, class arbitrations have been 
developing in other parts of the Americas. The evidence shows one 
case in Colombia as well as court decisions in other countries, such as 
Canada.87  Under the Colombian case, Valencia v. Bancolombia, a 
tribunal in Bogotá faced a class action initiated by shareholders due to 
the merger of two financial institutions.88 The claimants argued that 
class actions in Colombia were subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the domestic courts, but the Colombian Supreme Court rejected that 
                                                                                                                                  
81. Nater-Bass, supra note 21. 
82. Id. (citing GROUP PROCEEDING ACT §§ 4-6). 
83. See Per Henrik Lindblom, Global Class Actions: National Report: Group Litigation 
in Sweden, Update Paper Sections 2.5 and 3, 20 (2008), http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/
sites/default/files/documents/Sweden_Update_paper_Nov%20-08.pdf. 
84. Nater-Bass, supra note 21. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. Haber Kuck & Litt, supra note 62. 
88  . Valencia (Colombia) v. Bancolombia (Colombia), (Apr. 24, 2003) - Arbitral 
Tribunal from the Bogotá Chamber of Commerce, digest by Eduardo Zuleta for Institute of 
Transnational Arbitration (“ITA”). 
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argument on the grounds that the arbitration agreement (contained in 
the by-laws of one of the financial institutions) did not limit the types 
of claims that could be submitted to arbitration, and accordingly, it 
also included class arbitration. Although the Colombian Supreme 
Court did not go as far as affirming that class arbitrations are broadly 
permitted in Colombia, it allowed the arbitrators to decide whether 
“the existence of an arbitration agreement in a common shareholder 
agreement could give rise to a collective claim.”89 
Canada has also dealt with class arbitrations. The Canadian 
experience is a clear reflection of the way domestic regulations 
influence the development of class arbitration, as the courts have 
struggled with the letter and purpose of the legislation regarding both 
class relief and the availability of arbitration. As explained, to some 
extent the outcome depends “on whether the courts decide that ‘the 
right at issue is . . . a right to sue on a class-wide basis before the 
courts’ or whether ‘the right conferred by class action legislation is 
simply a right to proceed on a class-wide basis,’ regardless of the 
venue.”90 
Commentators from other countries where class arbitrations 
have not yet been developed are showing openness towards these 
kinds of procedures as well. For instance, an author stated the 
following: 
Despite the peculiarities of the USA’s experience, if compared to 
Brazilian law, it suggests that such a discussion is definitely 
interesting and can lead to solutions for the issues that, at first, 
seem to make the practice of class arbitration almost impossible. 
This might indeed be the new frontier for the Brazilian arbitration 
to explore.91 
Ultimately, other forms of collective redress sharing some similarities 
with US-style class arbitrations may be observed under the 
Supplementary Rules for Corporate Law Disputes drafted by the 
German Institution of Arbitration,92 or in the consumer-related Law 
231/2008 in Spain.93 Nevertheless, the method of analysis used by 
                                                                                                                                  
89.  From Class to Collective: The De-Americanization of Class Actions, supra note 34, 
at 498. 
90. Id. 
91. Mariani, supra note 45. 
92.  A European Form of Class Arbitration?, supra note 12. 
93. S.I. Strong, Collective Consumer Arbitration in Spain: A Civil Law Response to US-
Style Class Arbitration?, 30 J. OF INT’L ARB. 493, 495-510 (2013) [hereinafter Collective 
Consumer Arbitration in Spain]. 
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Canadian or Colombian courts, as well as in other jurisdictions, 
demonstrates that the development of class arbitration will not 
necessarily rely on analogies to the United States approach.94 
C. International Framework 
The rules of arbitration of the most renowned arbitral institutions 
are silent in regards to class arbitration. In many crucial points current 
regulations–such as the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) 
Rules of Arbitration or the London Court of International Arbitration 
(“LCIA”) Rules–cannot serve the purpose of providing an effective 
framework for international class arbitration proceedings because 
there are no guidelines governing class certification, class 
representative, notices, confidentiality or advances for costs, among 
other issues.95 International treaties are equally silent. 
As a matter of fact, arbitral tribunals and institutions acting in 
the field of transnational disputes “have permitted large, consolidated 
arbitrations, but have not embraced class arbitration.”96 In 2005, the 
ICC even issued a statement taking the position that class action 
litigation has “adverse consequences for business and consumers, 
outweighing the perceived benefits to society.”97 If this is the opinion 
of the ICC regarding class action litigation, it is highly likely that the 
arbitral institution might not support international class arbitrations.  
Several problems may arise because of the lack of an appropriate 
regulatory regime. Delays, challenges and the potential 
unenforceability of class arbitration awards would negatively affect 
the development of class arbitration within the field of international 
commercial arbitration.98 However, some type of collective relief has 
been observed in the field of international investment arbitration, for 
instance, in an International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (“ICSID”) case filed by more than 190,000 Italian parties 
against Argentina. 99  As explained in the Abaclat v. Argentine 
Republic ICSID award, “collective proceedings emerged where they 
                                                                                                                                  
94.  From Class to Collective: The De-Americanization of Class Actions, supra note 34, 
at 498. 
95. Nater-Bass, supra note 21. 
96. Haber Kuck & Litt, supra note 62. 
97. Nater-Bass, supra note 21. 
98. Id. 
99. From Class to Collective: The De-Americanization of Class Actions, supra note 34, 
at 495. 
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constituted the only way to ensure an effective remedy in protection 
of a substantive right provided by contract or law.”100 The Abaclat 
decision acknowledged that each individual claimant consented to 
ICSID arbitration and was fully identified, differentiating the 
proceedings from US-style class actions in which a representative 
“initiates a proceeding in the name of a class composed of an 
undetermined number of unidentified claimants” and concluding that 
the case seemed “to be a sort of a hybrid kind of collective 
proceedings, in the sense that it starts as aggregate proceedings, but 
then continues with features similar to representative proceedings due 
to the high number of claimants involved.” 101  Another mass 
arbitration was conducted under the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty by 
the shareholders of a Russian oil company.102 
V.  CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL CLASS ARBITRATION 
International class arbitration must address significant challenges 
in order to become a predictable and fair mechanism to resolve 
transnational business disputes. 103  This section identifies some of 
those hazards by classifying them into four different categories: (a) 
conceptual challenges; (b) issues related to the arbitration agreement; 
(c) procedural concerns that should be solved; and (d) problems that 
could appear in the enforcement stage of a class arbitration award.104 
A. Conceptual Challenges 
1. Representative Relief 
The arbitration community has discussed whether representative 
relief constitutes a neutral procedure providing the parties with an 
opportunity to be heard, 105  which is expected in any arbitration 
proceeding. As a matter of fact, one of the most important 
                                                                                                                                  
100.  Abaclat and Others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶ 190 (Aug. 4, 2011). 
101. Id. at 191. 
102. From Class to Collective: The De-Americanization of Class Actions, supra note 34, 
at 495. 
103 . Roman Khodykin, Class Arbitration: Is There an Appetite for It in Europe?, 
LEXOLOGY (May 14, 2015), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=45971385-112d-
47dd-b6b4-40863e0128ca  
104 . Several of the challenges that will be identified in the following lines are 
interrelated between them, even if classified in different categories. 
105. Does Class Arbitration “Change the Nature” of Arbitration?, supra note 8, at 266. 
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requirements for any international commercial arbitration is that both 
parties must be treated fairly and equally, providing them with the 
opportunity to argue their positions and present their case.106 Indeed, 
Article 18 of the UNCITRAL Model Law–which has been adopted in 
seventy States in a total of 100 jurisdictions–107 confirms that the 
parties shall be treated with equality, giving them a full opportunity to 
adequately present their case. 
Class arbitration raises several challenges in connection with 
consent and the involvement of the class members in the proceedings. 
Moreover, it is important to acknowledge that some States with strong 
regulatory regimes have traditionally taken a position against 
representative relief because–they claim–US class actions and similar 
procedures “are an abuse of individual rights.”108 It would certainly be 
impracticable that the members of the class should be expected to 
agree on the appointment of the arbitrators and the applicable 
procedure, especially in cases where class actions are structured under 
opting-out mechanisms rather than opting in. As an active 
involvement from all class members would be inefficient, it is 
submitted that allowing intermediaries to bring claims for 
representative relief could solve some of the problems in connection 
with the appointment of the arbitrator, opt-in versus opt-out, notice 
requirements or even the res judicata effect of class arbitration 
awards. 
2. Privacy and Confidentiality 
Confidentiality is an important feature of international 
commercial arbitration.109 According to a survey that ranked eleven 
perceived benefits of international arbitration, confidentiality obtained 
the third place.110 Meanwhile, a clear majority of in-house counsels 
                                                                                                                                  
106. Alan Redfern, The Practical Distinction Between the Burden of Proof and the 
Taking of Evidence, in 10 THE STANDARDS AND BURDEN OF PROOF IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION 321 (1994). 
107. Status of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 
UNCITRAL (as amended, 2006), http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/
1985Model_arbitration_status.html. 
108. Class Arbitration Outside the United-States: Reading the Tea Leaves, supra note 
13, at 201. 
109. WAINCYMER, supra note 1, at 103 
110 . 2013 International Arbitration Survey: Corporate Choices in International 
Arbitration Industry Perspectives, PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS (2013), http://www.
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(eighty-four percent) recognized choosing international arbitration in 
part because of that characteristic of the procedure.111Class arbitration 
might pose a problem in this regard, as confidentiality would be 
undermined due to the need of providing information to the public.112 
The fact that class arbitrations are aimed to affect a broad number of 
parties implies that it “must deviate from strict application of the 
principles of privacy and confidentiality, at least to some extent.”113 
Indeed, relevant information ought to be disclosed to potential parties, 
especially if the procedure considers an opt-out mechanism because 
“the consequences of failing to opt out of a collective proceeding are 
more burdensome than the consequences of failing to opt in.”114 As 
the US Supreme Court explained in the Stolt-Nielsen case, “the 
presumption of privacy and confidentiality that applies in many 
bilateral arbitrations shall not apply in class arbitrations, thus 
potentially frustrating the parties’ assumptions when they agreed to 
arbitrate.”115 
However, it is important to note that confidentiality is not 
universally considered an essential or characteristic feature of 
arbitration.116 Privacy and confidentiality are not deemed an “absolute 
protection as a matter of national or international law.”117 Moreover, 
court decisions have suggested that “the principles of privacy and 
confidentiality can be overcome in situations where there is some 
public interest at stake.”118 
                                                                                                                                  
111. Id. 
112. Nater-Bass, supra note 21. 
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3. Efficiency and Informality 
Concerns have also been raised in connection with the efficiency 
of class arbitration when compared with judicial class actions, 
particularly in relation with hearings or notice to class members, all of 
which will require an important amount of time for the proceeding to 
be conducted properly. This is not a minor issue, as noted from the 
words of an author stating that most “arbitration lawyers and users of 
arbitration services would probably agree that efficiency is a key issue 
in international arbitration, or that efficiency of arbitration is a key 
issue.” 119  Some have explained that efficiency problems may be 
easily solved by allowing only the representative together with a class 
counsel to participate in the proceedings, rather than “each individual 
party for himself, with his own lawyer.”120 
In addition, class arbitration faces the challenge of requiring a 
higher number of formalities,121 such as those required to give proper 
notice to the potential members of a class. The concern that class 
arbitration might jeopardize the informality of the arbitration 
procedure can be observed in the US Supreme Court decision of 
AT&T Mobility v. Concepción, where the court held that “[r]equiring 
the availability of class wide arbitration interferes with fundamental 
attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with 
the FAA.” 122  However, as previously explained in this Article, 
arguments in the sense that international class arbitration includes 
excessive formalities are “unpersuasive as a means of supporting the 
claim that class arbitration affects the fundamental nature of 
arbitration.”123 
Besides acknowledging that class arbitration has unique features 
that should be addressed when organizing the proceeding, it is 
important to note that informality has not been universally considered 
an essential or characteristic feature of arbitration. 124  Moreover, 
traditional arbitrations are sometimes conducted under a complex 
frame that can be even more formal than a class arbitration procedure. 
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As stated, “arbitration is, and has long been, a highly diverse form of 
dispute resolution, routinely including very formal, very large and 
very complicated multi-party proceedings.”125 
B.  Challenges Related to the Arbitration Agreement 
1. Consent and Validity of the Arbitration Agreement 
An essential requirement of a valid and effective arbitration 
proceeding is the existence of an agreement between the parties to 
submit their disputes to arbitration rather than litigation before 
domestic courts. Accordingly, the first condition that any class 
arbitration needs to comply with is showing that the arbitration 
agreement is valid and enforceable.126 
The applicable laws at the seat of arbitration will generally have 
different rules regarding the formal requirements of the arbitration 
agreement. However, all jurisdictions accept that “only parties that 
have actually agreed to arbitrate their disputes can be compelled to 
arbitration proceedings.”127 For instance, the French Supreme Court 
supported the position that “the validity of an arbitration agreement 
should be determined primarily in light of the common intent of the 
parties.”128Therefore, the key challenge to class arbitrations does not 
lie in the formal validity requirements of the arbitration agreement–
which might not vary with respect to a traditional arbitration. Rather, 
it lies in determining whether the class members actually consented to 
submit their disputes to arbitration and to the particular type of 
procedure that is class arbitration.129 This might be a problem in opt-
out systems, where the members of the class “may not have actual 
notice of the arbitration, and are thus unable to raise their objections 
to the arbitration clause, but will nevertheless be bound by any award 
rendered in the arbitration.”130 
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2. Who Decides Whether an Arbitration Agreement Allows Class 
Arbitration? 
As previously noted in this Article, the academic community in 
the United States has different opinions on whether it is for the courts 
or the arbitrators to decide if a particular arbitration agreement allows 
class arbitration.131 The existence of the referred discussion suggests 
that a similar one could occur in the context of international class 
arbitrations. In this regard, the better view seems to suggest that 
arbitrators should make that decision, in line with the principle of 
kompetenz-kompetenz, 132  which provides that arbitrators have the 
power to decide on their own jurisdiction. 133  Accordingly, it is 
submitted that they should have the authority to decide whether an 
arbitration clause allows class arbitration or not. Moreover, this 
approach is confirmed by the fact that the party resisting class 
arbitration–at least in US procedures–usually contends that such a 
mechanism was not contemplated in the arbitration agreement, but 
generally “do not contest the authority of the arbitral tribunal to make 
that determination.”134 
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3. Silent Arbitration Clauses: Do They Prohibit or Authorize Class 
Arbitrations?  
The United States experience shows a potential problem arising 
from initiating a class action under an arbitration agreement that is 
silent about class arbitration proceedings. This discussion—whether 
silent arbitration clauses prohibit or authorize class arbitration—is a 
highly sensitive challenge for the development of international class 
arbitration because most arbitration agreements are silent in regards to 
such type of proceedings. Domestic courts in different jurisdictions 
might interpret the issue dissimilarly. Although it is possible to 
submit that the legal community should address the issue with a pro-
arbitration approach, so far it is advisable for those interested in 
allowing class arbitrations to expressly consider that possibility in 
their arbitration agreements.135 
4. Are Class Arbitration Waivers Admissible?  
The parties could also exclude the possibility of class arbitration 
in the arbitration agreement. However, these waivers should be 
analyzed to prevent abuses from companies that intend to avoid class 
actions by inserting arbitration agreements in their contracts while at 
the same time excluding any form of class or group arbitration. As a 
matter of fact, some courts in the United States have overridden class 
action waivers as violative of substantive rights.136 Furthermore, the 
US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that at least regarding 
antitrust issues, contractual waivers of class action arbitration were 
unenforceable because they prevented potential claimants from 
enforcing their rights.137 While it is questionable whether the decision 
of the US Court of Appeals may be transferred to other areas of the 
law,138 it is important to consider that the US Supreme Court already 
recognized the general validity of class arbitration waivers in the 
AT&T Mobility LLC and the American Express Co. cases. 139 
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However, the legal community seems to agree that if a corporation 
tries to impose a clause that would “preclude the use of class actions 
in any forum,” such a clause is deemed to be “unenforceable by the 
courts in most cases, either on the basis of the unconscionability 
theory, or because it contravenes the terms, legislative history or 
purpose of a specific statute.”140 
5. Arbitrability of the Dispute 
Most international treaties and regulations allow States to 
determine whether a dispute is arbitrable or not; in other words, to 
decide if “specific classes of disputes are barred from arbitration.”141 
The issue of arbitrability is aimed to examine whether specific claims 
are capable of settlement by arbitration or if they must be decided by 
a domestic court under the laws of the seat of arbitration or where the 
enforcement of the award is being sought.142 
Article II(1) of the New York Convention establishes that 
contracting States shall recognize an arbitration agreement 
“concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration,”143 
while Article V(2)(a) of the same convention provides that 
recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may be refused if 
the “subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement.”144 
On the other hand, Article 1(5) of the UNCITRAL Model Law leaves 
matters of arbitrability to the decision of each jurisdiction, as States 
take different views on the subject and may “fill in the arbitrability 
provision” as they deem appropriate.145 
Accordingly, the development of international arbitration as a 
mechanism to resolve class disputes faces the challenge of not being 
supported under the applicable laws, as domestic regulations are fully 
capable of limiting the scope of class arbitration to certain substantive 
matters or declaring that class arbitrations are non-arbitrable at all. As 
explained by an author addressing the validity of the arbitration 
agreement in class actions: “Another requirement of substantive 
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validity of the arbitration agreement that may create obstacles for 
class arbitrations is arbitrability. Applicable provisions limiting the 
scope of potential arbitrations may cause problems as well.”146 
Generally, it is submitted that any doubt on the scope of 
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration. 147  For 
instance, in Switzerland, it is contested whether a dispute regarding 
consumer law is arbitrable and also whether state courts have 
exclusive jurisdiction over such types of disputes.148 Such enquiries 
should be analyzed with a pro-arbitration approach. 
C. Procedural Challenges 
1. Due Process and Public Policy Concerns 
Due process is an essential element in international arbitration, 
and its importance for the arbitral process has been widely 
acknowledged by the legal community. 149  Class arbitration raises 
several due process concerns in connection with the appointment of 
arbitrators and the notice requirements, among others. To address 
these issues some authors have proposed that the proceedings should 
be subject to court supervision for guaranteeing that the parties’ 
procedural rights are adequately taken into consideration. This 
approach reflects some lack of confidence in arbitration, especially 
because arbitrators and arbitral institutions are adequately prepared to 
address any procedural challenge to ensure a reliable and efficient 
proceeding.150 
Experienced arbitrators are well prepared to guarantee the 
protection of the parties’ due process rights in all types of arbitrations. 
Accordingly, the role of domestic courts in class arbitrations should 
be limited in accordance with the principle of minimum intervention, 
just like in any other international arbitration conducted on an 
individual basis. As stated, it is “beyond doubt that class actions are 
complex procedures but arbitrations in general tend to be more and 
more intricate without this increasing complexity raising 
                                                                                                                                  
146. Nater-Bass, supra note 21, at 25. 
147. HANOTIAU, supra note 2, at 266. 
148. Nater-Bass, supra note 21, at 25. 
149. See Matti S. Kurkela, Due Process in Arbitration: A Finnish Perspective, 21 J. OF 
INT’L ARB. 221, 224 (2004). 
150. Nater-Bass, supra note 21, at 27-28. 
818 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39:791 
insurmountable problems for arbitration experts.”151 This is why some 
authors have explained that “no particular due process concerns 
against class action arbitration should be raised and no particular 
measures such as the possibility for court intervention/supervision 
should be taken.”152 
2. Selection of Arbitrators 
The possibility to select the arbitrator has long been considered a 
fundamental right in international arbitration. 153  Originally, many 
multiparty proceedings failed to materialize when there were more 
than two parties to the dispute, as the rules for appointing arbitrators 
only contemplated bilateral proceedings in which each party was 
entitled to select its own arbitrator, with the chair to be nominated by 
the two party appointments or by the arbitral institution. As a result, 
many domestic laws and international rules now provide that a neutral 
institution or domestic court “can appoint the entire tribunal in cases 
where the parties cannot themselves agree on individual panelists or 
selection procedures.”154 
The appointment can certainly be difficult in class arbitrations or 
other multi-party proceedings where there are several persons 
involved as claimants or defendants. 155 Unnamed class members “do 
not officially become parties to the proceeding unless and until they 
have each been given the option of joining the action.” 156  The 
challenge is to accept that absent class members do not have the 
possibility to select their arbitrator as usually the class representatives 
make the appointment on behalf of all the members and, similarly, 
that the defendant is deprived of the possibility to appoint its 
arbitrator for each individual dispute.157 
However, it is submitted that class arbitration protects the 
parties’ fundamental right to select the arbitrators, at least in opt-in 
procedures. Unnamed class members who choose to participate in the 
proceedings will somehow ratify the choice of arbitrators made by the 
class representative, and potential class members who choose not to 
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join the proceedings will not be affected by the award and 
consequently by the appointment.158 The fact that a respondent would 
not be able to select an arbitrator for each individual dispute does not 
change this conclusion, as it can be argued that by consenting to class 
arbitration the respondent also accepted the dispute to be resolved in a 
unique proceeding before a single arbitral tribunal. 
3. Notice Requirements and Certification Process: Opt-in or Opt-
out? 
As a decision rendered in a class arbitration is binding on all 
members of the class, 159  international class arbitration may be 
structured under an opt-in or an opt-out system. The opt-in system is 
applied whenever the party “must affirmatively signal that he or she 
wishes to join the class,” while the opt-out approach refers to the 
mechanism in which “the party is assumed to be part of the class 
unless he or she indicates otherwise.”160 As collective proceedings are 
designed to resolve mass disputes, it is important that the 
effectiveness of the award is not hindered by arguments about who is 
bound by the proceeding.161 
One of the challenges facing class arbitration is that the class 
members might not be aware that a claim is pending or that they are 
allowed to opt-out of the class action and file a claim individually. In 
an attempt to address these concerns, the tribunal should generally 
order “the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances,” 
which may include “individual notice to all identifiable members” 
and/or “the publication or broadcasting of notices in newspapers, on 
television or via other forms of media.” 162  Certainly, general 
standards for the notification of absent class members should be 
adopted for international class arbitrations.163 
Another unresolved issue is determining if the arbitrator or the 
domestic court should decide whether and to what extent a class 
should be certified. While there are rulings holding that the arbitrator 
should decide and others explaining that such determination lies 
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within the courts competence, 164  it is submitted that the arbitral 
tribunal has broad powers to conduct the proceedings and that 
domestic courts should only assist the arbitrator when needed. 
4. Early Resolution 
Some types of domestic class actions provide defendants with 
the opportunity to file a motion for dismissing a defective class 
action. Although such motions might be more unusual in the field of 
arbitration, an efficient international class arbitration procedure 
should be structured considering the potential importance of 
dispositive motions to avoid creating a time- and cost-consuming 
process for adjudicating massive disputes when the claims are clearly 
flawed.165 
5. Cost and Fees 
It is logical that the fees of the arbitrators will likely be higher in 
class arbitrations than in other international arbitration disputes and 
proportionate to the additional commitment of time. For instance, the 
arbitrators would be required to address additional procedural issues 
not present in traditional arbitration, such as whether the arbitration 
agreement allows class arbitration, certification of the class and notice 
requirements. The process can also involve disputes between various 
claimants and the claimants with their counsels, objections to 
settlement, among several other issues at each stage of the 
proceedings. Similarly, the lawyers’ fees might require an adjustment, 
especially in those countries where contingency is not allowed.166 If a 
decision on costs is favorable to the defendant, collecting the fees will 
be a challenge as well.167 
The discussion regarding costs and fees illustrates how useful 
the involvement of institutional arbitration centers could be for 
developing international class arbitration procedures. For instance, the 
arbitral institution could determine a system to fix the fees of the 
arbitrators. Such a system would not have to leave such decisions to 
the discretion of arbitrators. 
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6. Scope of Court Assistance: Hybrid Procedure? 
While international commercial arbitration has been 
characterized as an autonomous dispute resolution mechanism in 
which the arbitral tribunal is empowered to render a final decision, 
class arbitration has showed a higher involvement from domestic 
courts than traditional arbitration, mainly as a result of practical 
concerns. Certification of the class members and notice requirements 
are some of the issues over which domestic courts might exercise 
supervisory powers in order to guarantee the procedural rights of all 
class members.168 
It is submitted that arbitrators are as well-equipped as courts to 
protect the integrity of the arbitral process in international class 
arbitrations. This is why domestic courts should show deference and a 
favorable attitude towards the powers of the arbitral tribunal to 
conduct class arbitrations, just as in any traditional international 
arbitration proceeding. 169  Applying the principle of minimum 
intervention and neutrality, domestic courts should assist arbitral 
tribunals only if needed, acknowledging their powers and the 
independence of the arbitral system. 
7. Pleading Standards 
Pleading requirements are usually not required in arbitration. 
Accordingly, some authors have explained that class arbitration faces 
the challenge of determining whether these or other similar standards 
should be inserted into class arbitration as a protection for defendants. 
An example is provided by the 1995 US Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act, which sets heightened requirements for federal securities 
class actions pleadings.170 It is submitted that no additional pleading 
requirements should be applied to international class arbitrations. 
8. Discovery 
An essential concern regarding international class arbitration is 
determining how the arbitral process will address discovery. As in 
securities or product liability, claimants might have little or no 
relevant knowledge other than what is publicly available, which 
makes discovery extremely important to the claimants and also puts 
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an uneven burden on the defendant to settle. It has been explained that 
if discovery is “sharply limited, as it often is in international 
arbitration, this could substantially alter the balance of power in class 
actions.”171 
D. Enforcement Challenges 
1. Challenges to International Enforcement 
International arbitration rules and principles recognize that 
arbitral awards are binding and that the parties must comply with the 
decision without any delay. While there is a high level of voluntary 
compliance,172 recognition and enforcement before domestic courts is 
still necessary in several cases.173 
Enforcement raises a number of concerns with respect to awards 
issued in class arbitration proceedings. As provided in Article V(1)(a) 
of the New York Convention, recognition and enforcement of class 
arbitration awards could be refused when “the award was rendered on 
the basis of an invalid arbitration agreement.”174 Similarly, Article 
V(1)(b) of the New York Convention could be used by a non-present 
class member under an opt-out system to claim that it was not given 
proper notice. Furthermore, Articles V(1)(d) and V(2)(a), which refer 
to the appointment of the arbitrators, the procedure, and arbitrability, 
could also be brought against the recognition and enforcement of 
class arbitration awards.175 
The most likely objection to recognition and enforcement of 
international class awards will be based on notions of individual 
procedural rights, a central principle of constitutional law in many 
jurisdictions.176 As explained by an author, “state courts, particularly 
those in civil-law countries, will have to consider whether and to what 
extent they should permit foreign conceptions of rights to be enforced 
in arbitration” because even where a jurisdiction “domestically 
prohibits the use of representative actions in its own courts, that may 
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not be an adequate reason rising to the level of international public 
policy for the state’s courts to refuse enforcement on a wholesale 
basis.”177Accordingly, all these issues should be addressed by the 
parties and the arbitral tribunal from the outset of the proceedings, 
taking into consideration that arbitrators have a duty to render an 
enforceable award according to “national laws, institutional rules, 
ethical codes and scholarly writing.”178 It is submitted that domestic 
courts should follow a firm pro-arbitration policy, generally 
permitting the enforcement of international class awards. 
2. Risk of Review 
International class arbitration faces several obstacles in 
jurisdictions providing the parties with the possibility to review the 
class arbitration award before domestic courts. The basis for review 
might open the door to unsatisfied class members or defendants 
challenging the award, for instance, on the grounds of an alleged 
violation of the right to be heard (especially in opt-out systems) or 
based on the fact that the arbitrators lacked jurisdiction under the 
relevant arbitration agreement (especially regarding validity and 
arbitrability issues).179 For instance, the Swiss Private International 
Law Statute allows the parties to challenge the award based on 
allegations of lack of jurisdiction and for violation of the right to be 
heard as well. 180  An arbitration award could be appealed under 
German law for similar reasons.181 
3. Punitive Damages 
Punitive damages are those awarded not only to compensate a 
party, but also with the purpose of punishing and deterring the 
wrongdoer as well as others from pursuing similar conduct. Although 
typically present in class actions, these last two functions–punishment 
and deterrence–could be a problem in the international arena because 
they are not accepted in all jurisdictions, especially in civil law 
countries. This might lead domestic courts to refuse recognition and 
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enforcement of the class award under the public policy exception 
established in Article V(2) of the New York Convention.182 
Some authors have argued that awarding punitive damages 
should not necessarily be considered as a valid ground for refusing 
enforcement. Accordingly, domestic courts “should construe the 
public policy defense in a very constrained manner,” only applying it 
in extreme instances. 183  This is the only way that international 
arbitration may function as an efficient mechanism to resolve 
transnational business disputes. They explain that otherwise “the 
entire regime of international arbitration that is largely based on the 
certainty of enforcement created by the New York Convention 
[would] be severely undermined.”184 
4. Settlement, Voluntary Dismissals, and Compromise 
Class action proceedings bring several challenges of 
administration and fairness in connection with potential settlements. 
This is why US courts have incorporated the duty to analyze the 
fairness, reasonableness and adequacy of settlements as an element of 
due process.185 Arbitral tribunals will certainly have a similar duty, 
although it has been explained that arbitrators should be prepared–just 
as judges–to anticipate “poorly equipped class representatives and 
attorneys, inadequate class settlement provisions, and overly generous 
fee stipulations.”186 
Similarly, the administration of settlements requires “compiling 
and maintaining mailing lists of class members and providing 
adequate notice, collecting and evaluating individual proofs of claim 
from each class member who wishes to benefit from the settlement, 
and managing the investment and distribution of settlement funds.”187 
As explained, arbitral tribunals “ordinarily become functus officio 
after they render an award, whereas courts are available to resolve 
disputes about class award distribution long after a judgment is 
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rendered.”188 It is submitted that these issues should be addressed 
from the outset of the proceedings. However, arbitrators are well-
equipped to assume a preeminent role in international class 
arbitrations, with the appropriate assistance of arbitral institutions and 
specialized companies that have professionalized the settlement 
administration industry. 
CONCLUSION 
The future of international class arbitration remains uncertain. 
However, it is expected that these procedures will become more 
popular in the coming years as the use of different mechanisms for 
collective redress has increased in several jurisdictions and some class 
action disputes have already been observed in a transnational level. 
Accordingly, the international arbitration community should 
implement a uniform regulatory framework addressing the particular 
challenges of international class arbitration. 
It is submitted that an international class arbitration procedure 
should be crafted to guarantee an efficient and informal process, 
recognizing the full authority of the arbitral tribunal, and with 
minimum intervention from domestic courts. An express agreement to 
arbitrate should always be required. While there should not be a 
problem when the parties explicitly consent to class arbitrations, the 
arbitral tribunal should be deemed empowered to decide whether a 
class action is admissible when the arbitration agreement is silent. 
Similarly, the arbitrators should have the authority to determine 
whether class arbitration waivers are valid and effective under the 
applicable law. 
Allowing representative relief under an opt-in or opt-out system 
is of the essence. However, at the moment, opt-out procedures seem 
to present too many problems for international class arbitrations. Opt-
in systems guarantee that all participants are made aware of and have 
fully consented to class arbitration, considerably reducing the risks of 
class member claims that they had no possibility of participating in 
selecting the arbitrators, presenting their case, or being actively 
involved in the proceedings. Unnamed class members choosing to 
participate in the arbitration will be deemed to have ratified the choice 
of arbitrators made by the class representative as well as the 
subsequent positions and actions adopted during the course of the 
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proceeding. Therefore, adopting an opt-in system enhances the 
chances of enforcing the award. 
Bifurcating the proceeding between a class certification stage 
and the hearing on the merits is also advisable. Certainly an efficient 
international class arbitration process should also encompass the 
opportunity to file dispositive motions in order to avoid a time- and 
cost-consuming process when the claims are clearly defective. 
Confidentiality in international class arbitrations must also be 
protected to the extent possible, although it should be acknowledged 
that disclosing relevant information to potential parties is essential, 
especially in opt-in systems. Thus, almost certainly some confidential 
aspects of the dispute shall be disclosed to implement an effective 
international class arbitration procedure. 
The international arbitration community should support the 
enforcement of class awards under the New York Convention, 
showing that the presumption of enforceability that is usually granted 
to international awards also includes these special types of collective 
proceedings. The arbitrators should carefully consider the applicable 
law in light of their duty to render an enforceable award, as issues of 
arbitrability or punitive damages could compromise the effectiveness 
of the international class arbitration process. 
An international class arbitration procedure could be established 
under soft or hard law provisions. For the moment, arbitral 
institutions should play a key role by providing arbitration rules 
specifically dealing with international class arbitrations, because the 
complexity of these procedures advises that they should be crafted 
and supervised by highly competent experts. This would offer an 
opportunity to discuss relevant issues by experts and stakeholders 
worldwide. If the procedure proves to be suitable for transnational 
business disputes, most institutional arbitration centers shall join the 
trend and jurisdictions could implement these procedures under their 
own domestic laws. 
As class arbitration has been criticized by some renowned 
international institutions and most companies are not supportive of 
widespread class arbitrations, the international arbitration community 
should support the development of international class arbitration and 
show the advantages of adopting specific rules of procedure. 
International class arbitration increases the efficiency and reduces the 
costs of the proceeding, as companies can avoid having to arbitrate 
numerous single disputes and claimants are offered the opportunity to 
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bring a claim when the individual amounts do not justify initiating an 
individual proceeding. In addition, international class arbitration 
secures access to justice, guarantees that all the parties are treated 
equally and prevents different tribunals issuing conflicting decisions 
when confronted with the same set of facts. 
While the international legal community discusses a basis for a 
common regulation of international class arbitrations, it is submitted 
that any regulatory framework should aim to secure an efficient and 
fair procedure inclined towards rendering an enforceable award and 
acknowledging the procedural rights of all the parties involved. 
Ultimately, as international commercial arbitration is a system praised 
for offering a predictable and efficient mechanism to resolve 
transnational business disputes, the legal community should promptly 
implement a specific set of rules for international class arbitrations 
that avoids uncertainties and addresses its special features. 
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